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Introduction
Nearly four decades have passed since the Supreme Court
established the well-known two-step test for judicial deference to agency
interpretations of law in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.1 According to the Chevron Court, an agency’s
interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with admin–
istering receives “considerable weight” if Congress has not addressed
the precise question at issue and the agency’s interpretation is a
permissible construction of the statute. 2 Chevron now faces an
uncertain future and mounting criticism, including three Justices
openly challenging the doctrine. 3 In fact, Congress recently made
1.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

2.

Id. at 842–44.

3.

See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit executive
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative
power . . . .”); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas,
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multiple attempts to replace Chevron deference with de novo review.4
And some suggest that while judicial deference serves a critical function,
federal courts’ application of the doctrine requires clarification or
reform.5
If the Court ultimately rejects Chevron, as some critics advocate,6
it must still identify how federal courts should approach agency
interpretations that have the force of law as well as those that do not.7
Justifications for abandoning Chevron, or “great-weight” deference,
include challenges to its constitutionality, allegations of systematic
judicial bias, and its inconsistent application. 8 Some challenges to
Chevron call for de novo review of all agency interpretations, restoring
the judiciary to its constitutionally mandated position of independent
judicial review under Article III.9
But even before Chevron, courts deferred to agencies to some
extent.10 In the nineteenth century, the judiciary was more concerned
J., concurring) (“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-power
questions.”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129
Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2014) (“In many ways, Chevron is nothing
more than a judicially orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the
Executive Branch.”); see also Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that the majority’s
application of Chevron is “an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in
interpreting federal statutes”).
4.

See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong.
§ 4(e) (2017); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong.
§ 107 (2017); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, S. 1577,
115th Cong. § 2 (2017); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017,
H.R. 76, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).

5.

See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call
Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 Colum. L. Rev.
1143 (2012) (suggesting a reformulation of the Chevron doctrine to clarify
the respective roles of courts and agencies in statutory interpretation);
Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2154 (advocating for the elimination of
Chevron’s threshold “clarity versus ambiguity decision”); Linda Jellum,
Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59
Admin. L. Rev. 725 (2007) (criticizing federal courts’ application of
Chevron Step One); Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron,
115 Colum. L. Rev. 1867 (2015) (advocating for greater clarity of the
Chevron doctrine).

6.

See Phillip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187,
1249–51 (2016).

7.

See infra text accompanying notes 126–39.

8.

See generally Hamburger, supra note 6; Jonathan R. Siegel, The
Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 937 (2018)
(summarizing and challenging the main arguments against Chevron
deference).

9.

See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 6.

10.

See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1154–55.
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with courts engaging in “executive” and “administrative” decisions than
it was with agencies encroaching on courts’ Article III powers.11 The
growth of the administrative state gave rise to what became known as
the appellate-review model, under which federal courts reviewed agency
decisions just as they would review a trial court’s decisions.12 De novo
review “failed to achieve a differentiation of functions, produced delay,
and was duplicative and wasteful.” 13 Courts also recognized that
agencies often had knowledge and expertise superior to their own.14
Rejecting Chevron in favor of de novo review rejects an entire history
of why courts deferred to agencies in the first place. But the options
are not only Chevron deference or de novo review. For nearly thirty
years, Idaho courts have experimented with a unique four-prong test
for reviewing agencies’ statutory interpretations. This Note analyzes
that test and envisions its hypothetical application in the federal court
system as Chevron’s potential replacement.
When one thinks of Idaho, one likely thinks of its potato fields or
its vast stretches of forest. What does not likely come to mind is the
judicial-deference test of this mountainous, northwestern state. No
scholarship in the last decade has engaged Idaho’s deference doctrine,15
and the recent spotlight has been on states abandoning deference for de
novo review.16 Most states afford either some form of “great-weight”
deference or no deference at all to agency interpretations.17 But the
11.

Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of
the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev.
939, 980 (2011).

12.

Id. at 940, 953.

13.

Id. at 974.

14.

Id. at 999.

15.

See Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State
Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron
Doctrine, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 977 (2008).

16.

See, e.g., Amanda Reilly, Will States Follow Arizona in Assault on
Chevron?, E&E News (May 9, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1060081237 [https://perma.cc/RM8T-UG42]; Mark Chenoweth, Florida
Voters Join Chevron Revolt and Strike a Blow Against Judicial Bias,
Forbes (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markchenoweth/
2018/11/08/florida-voters-join-chevron-revolt-and-strike-a-blow-againstjudicial-bias/#3feed3c04fe6 [https://perma.cc/KB89-V595]; Seyfarth Shaw
LLP, Chevron Deference Under Attack at State Level, JDSupra (Apr.
19, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/chevron-deference-underattack-at-state-21357/ [https://perma.cc/9684-LMPN]; Jonathan Wood,
17 States: The Time Has Come to Reconsider Chevron Deference and
This is the Case to Do it With, Pac. Legal Found. (July 6, 2018),
https://pacificlegal.org/17-states-the-time-has-come-to-reconsider-chevrondeference-and-this-is-the-case-to-do-it-with/ [https://perma.cc/F8ED-CQH8].
See, e.g., Ass’n of Cal. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 386 P.3d 1188, 1196 (Cal. 2017)
(affording “great weight and respect” to agency constructions); State ex

17.
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trend of the last two decades has been for states to abandon greatweight-deference regimes in favor of de novo review for some of the
same reasons critics challenge Chevron. 18 Idaho, on the other hand,
rejects such all-or-nothing approaches, instead employing a pragmatic,
four-prong test that balances the complexity of the administrative state
with the judiciary’s independent-review responsibility.19
In formulating its four-prong test, the Idaho Supreme Court
consulted its own case history, the deference principles of the other
forty-nine states, and Chevron itself.20 In surveying its own history of
judicial deference, the court summarized its initial respect for agency
expertise and long-standing agency constructions, its increasing reliance
on judicial deference, and its eventual rejection of great-weight
deference. 21 While federal administrative law may be undergoing a
similar transition,22 Idaho is one step ahead. After briefly abandoning
its deference doctrine for no deference at all the Idaho judiciary
returned to its well-established justifications for judicial deference,

rel. Crowl v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Elections, 43 N.E.3d 406, 408 (Ohio 2015)
(affording “great deference”); Goldberg v. Bd. of Health of Granby, 830
N.E.2d 207, 213 (Mass. 2005) (applying a Chevron-like deference
doctrine); Entergy La., LLC v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 221 So. 3d 801,
805 (La. 2017) (agency interpretations of statutes receive no deference);
Neilson Co. (US), LLC v. Cty. Bd. of Arlington Cty., 767 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Va.
2015) (“[A] court never defers to an administrative interpretation . . . .”);
see also sources cited infra note 18.
18.

See, e.g., H.B. 2238, 53rd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Ariz. 2018) (“Section 12-910,
Arizona Revised Statutes is amended to read: . . . the court shall decide
all questions of law . . . without deference to any previous determination
that may have been made . . . by the agency”); Fla. Const. art. V,
§ 21 (“In interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court . . . may not
defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation . . . and must instead
interpret such statute or rule de novo.”); Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis.
Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21, 40, 54 (Wis. 2018) (rejecting a threetiered deference principle of “great weight,” “due weight,” and no
deference at all in favor of de novo review); King v. Miss. Military Dep’t,
245 So. 3d 404, 407–08 (Miss. 2018) (abandoning a deference principle of
“de novo but deferential review” for de novo review with no deference);
SBC Mich. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 754 N.W.2d 259, 271–72 (Mich. 2008)
(declining to adopt Chevron deference because “the unyielding deference
to agency statutory construction required by Chevron conflicts . . . with
the separation of powers principles”); Graham v. Dokter Trucking Grp.,
161 P.3d 695, 700–01 (Kan. 2007) (declining to award “great judicial
deference” to agency determinations of questions of law on undisputed
facts).

19.

See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206 (Idaho
1991).

20.

Id. at 1212–19.

21.

Id. at 1214–17.

22.

See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text.
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settling on an intermediate doctrine that it has consistently employed
for nearly thirty years.23
This Note explores Idaho’s intermediate approach in four parts.
Part I explains the background and substance of Idaho’s four-prong
test. Part II analyzes how Idaho courts apply each prong, comparing
each prong to its closest Chevron counterpart. Part III briefly addresses
how the four-prong test would fit into the federal deference regime,
specifically addressing the deference doctrines of Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.,24 Auer v. Robbins,25 and National Cable and Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services.26 In Skidmore, the Court held
that courts should afford deference to agency interpretations to the
extent that, “lacking [the] power to control,” the interpretation has the
“power to persuade.”27 After Chevron, courts came to apply Skidmore
to agency interpretations that lack the force of law.28 In Auer, the Court
held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation should control
unless the regulation is unambiguous. 29 And under Brand X, an
agency’s construction of a statute trumps a court’s prior interpretation
unless the statute is unambiguous.30 Part III anticipates how Idaho’s
four-prong test could either incorporate or render obsolete these federal
doctrines. And Part IV suggests an improvement to Idaho’s test,
specifically arguing that courts should apply each prong in a particular
order.

I. Idaho’s Four-Prong Test
Idaho’s four-prong test arose out of the same situation that Chevron
faces today. In Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission,31
the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned a deference regime of “great
weight” in favor of one of “free review” (i.e., de novo review).32 Despite
“myriad cases stat[ing] that the construction given a statute by an
23.

Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219.

24.

323 U.S. 134 (1944).

25.

519 U.S. 452 (1997).

26.

545 U.S. 967 (2005).

27.

Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.

28.

See infra text accompanying notes 171–85.

29.

See infra text accompanying notes 186–204.

30.

See infra text accompanying notes 205–08.

31.

751 P.2d 107 (Idaho 1988).

32.

The term “free review” is unique to Idaho. Id. at 109–10. As applied by
the Idaho judiciary, it refers to independent judicial review, or what other
states and the federal courts refer to as de novo review. See A&B
Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 301 P.3d 1270, 1272 (Idaho
2012).
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administrative agency is entitled to great weight,” the court found
“cogent reasons for straying from the Commission’s reading of the
statute and recognizing that the construction of a statute is [a] matter
of law for the judiciary.”33 The court then proceeded to apply the freereview standard.34 The Fair Share court did not broadly declare that it
was abandoning great-weight deference generally; rather, it found
“cogent reasons” to “apply the standard of free review to the
Commission’s interpretation.”35
Three years later, in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax
Commission,36 the Idaho Supreme Court read Fair Share as a complete
departure from great-weight deference. 37 At issue in Simplot was
whether the income of Simplot’s foreign subsidiaries could be combined
with that of its domestic subsidiaries for the purpose of computing its
“Idaho taxable income.”38 Simplot’s foreign subsidiaries had no taxable
income as defined by the Idaho Tax Code. The Tax Commission,
however, argued that the Idaho tax law did not answer “whether foreign
source income [could] be included in the ‘preapportionment tax base’ of
a multinational corporation.”39 Specifically, it argued that it could use
the foreign-source income to calculate the amount of income
apportionable to Idaho even if it did not consider the foreign-source
income as “taxable.” 40 The Commission further argued that the
provision controlling the apportionment calculation was a specific
statutory provision and, therefore, it should outweigh the more general
provision defining “taxable income.”41
The district court initially favored Simplot’s construction of the
law, calling the Commission’s interpretation “a strained and harsh
interpretation on a series of statutes that otherwise have a plain,
obvious, and rational meaning.”42 The Idaho legislature, however, had
previously passed a law that allowed corporations with foreign
subsidiaries to choose whether they wanted to exclude their foreignsource income from the apportionment process. 43 The district court
found that Simplot’s position—that its foreign-source income was, by
33.

Idaho Fair Share, 751 P.2d at 109–10.

34.

Id. at 110.

35.

Id. at 109–10.

36.

820 P.2d 1206 (Idaho 1991).

37.

Id. at 1211–12.

38.

Id. at 1207.

39.

Id. at 1208–09.

40.

Id. at 1209.

41.

Id. at 1208–09.

42.

Id. at 1209.

43.

Id. at 1210.
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definition, not “taxable income”—would render the new law
superfluous. The district court denied Simplot relief on this basis.44
Simplot appealed the district court’s decision to the Idaho Supreme
Court.45 The supreme court rejected the district court’s legal theory,
noting that the legislature is not required to make significant changes
when it enacts legislation.46 Nevertheless, the court noted that it was
still free to affirm the district court’s judgment if it could be supported
by some other correct legal theory.47 The court began its analysis with
the Commission’s interpretation of the Idaho Income Tax Act, noting
that Idaho had “long followed” great-weight deference until Fair Share,
when the court “substantially limited this rule.”48 The court suggested
that the free-review standard undermined its precedent of affording
deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations.49 As the Simplot court
saw it, free review allowed the court to ignore an agency’s interpretation
whenever the court disagreed with it. 50 Seeking to resolve Idaho’s
“tenuous and uncertain” rule of judicial deference, the court surveyed
other states’ deference regimes, the majority of which had shifted
towards free review.51 The Simplot court was also unpersuaded by a
return to great-weight deference, finding that those tests led to
inconsistent results, “leaving the impression that their administrative
agency interpretations are entitled to judicial deference only when those
interpretations are correct.”52 The court further commented, “a rule
that an agency construction will be followed only when it is correct is
no rule at all.”53
The court then turned to its own case history, identifying five
primary rationales for deferring to agencies. First, “the rule ensures
repose when important interests have ‘grown up’ in reliance on an
interpretation in existence for a number of years.”54 Second, “an agency
interpretation represents a ‘practical’ interpretation” because “stat–
utory language is often of necessity general and therefore cannot address
all of the details necessary for its effective implementation.”55 Third,
44.

Id. at 1209–10.

45.

Id. at 1210.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 1210–11.

49.

Id. at 1212.

50.

Id. at 1211–12.

51.

Id. at 1212.

52.

Id. at 1213.

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 1215.

55.

Id.
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“the legislature is charged with knowledge of how its statutes are
interpreted,” and “[b]y not altering the statutory text the legislature is
presumed to have sanctioned the agency interpretation.” 56 Fourth,
“when [an agency’s construction] is formulated contemporaneously with
the passage of the statute in question,” that construction “is entitled to
additional weight” because “the agency may have insight into
legislative intent at the time of enactment.”57 And fifth, some agencies
have more specialized expertise.58
The Simplot court also briefly acknowledged Chevron deference and
its underlying rationale of agency expertise. 59 Finally, the court
concluded that it should not apply free review to agency interpretations.
Rather, the court held that a “four-prong test” was the proper way to
determine the appropriate level of judicial deference that an agency
interpretation deserves. The four prongs are as follows: (1) whether the
agency has been “entrusted with the responsibility to administer the
statute at issue”;60 (2) whether the agency’s construction is reasonable;61
(3) whether the statutory text “expressly treat[s] the precise question
at issue”;62 and (4) “whether any of the rationales underlying the rule
of deference are present.”63 If an agency interpretation satisfies all four
prongs, the court must give the agency’s construction “considerable
weight.”64 If the interpretation fails under Prong Four, it is left to its
“persuasive force.”65 While the Simplot court did not expressly say what
level of deference, if any, is appropriate when an agency construction
fails on Prongs One, Two, or Three, Idaho courts uniformly apply free
review in those cases.66

56.

Id. at 1216.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id. at 1218.

60.

Id. at 1219.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 1219–20.

66.

See, e.g., Farrell v. Whiteman, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 n.2 (Idaho 2009)
(affording no deference because the interpretation failed Prong Three);
A&B Irrigation Distrib. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 301 P.3d 1270,
1272 (Idaho 2002) (affording no deference because the interpretation failed
Prong One); N. Snake Groundwater Distrib. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res.,
376 P.3d 722, 729 (Idaho 2016) (affording no deference because the
interpretation failed Prong Three).
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II. Comparing Simplot and Chevron
A. Prong One: Is the agency entrusted with the authority to administer
the statute?

Under Prong One, the court asks whether “the agency has been
entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue.”67
If the answer is yes, the agency is “‘impliedly clothed with power to
construe’ the law.”68 In Simplot, the court generally stated that the Tax
Commission was “impliedly clothed with power to construe” the
statutes at issue, but it did not reference the specific statutory
provisions from which the Tax Commission derived this authority.69
Of the four prongs, Prong One receives the least analysis in
subsequent cases. Courts typically do no more than briefly declare that
the agency does or does not have the authority to construe the statute,
as in Simplot. 70 For example, in Pearl v. Board of Professional
Discipline,71 the Board had the authority to construe the statute at
issue because it had statutory authority to “establish pursuant to the
administrative procedure act rules and regulations for the admin–
istration of this chapter.”72 In A&B Irrigation Distribution v. Idaho
Department of Water Resources, 73 however, the Director of the
Department of Water lacked the authority to administer the statute at
issue because the Director could point to no legislative directive
granting such authority. Instead, the Director argued that it had
authority to interpret the statute under the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act (IAPA).74 But the Director pointed only to the provision
of the IAPA that mandated that the Director comply with the IAPA.75
The court concluded that “[a] legislative directive that [the Depart–
ment] comply with the IAPA cannot reasonably be construed as dele–
gating to [the Department] the responsibility for administering the

67.

Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219.

68.

Id. (quoting Kopp v. State, 595 P.2d 309, 312 (Idaho 1979)).

69.

Id. at 1220 (quoting Kopp, 595 P.2d at 312).

70.

See, e.g., Westway Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 73 P.3d 721,
729–30 (Idaho 2003); Sons & Daughters of Idaho, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery
Comm’n, 156 P.3d 524, 527 (Idaho 2007); Canty v. Idaho State Tax
Comm’n, 59 P.3d 983, 988 (Idaho 2002); Herrmann v. Idaho, 403 P.3d
318, 321 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017).

71.

44 P.3d 1162 (Idaho 2002).

72.

Id. at 1168 (quoting Idaho Code § 54-1806(2) (2018)).

73.

301 P.3d 1270 (Idaho 2012).

74.

Id. at 1272.

75.

Id.
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IAPA.”76 The court then exercised free review to decide the appropriate
statutory construction.77
Idaho courts sometimes conflate Prong One with Prong Two or
Three, but this is not common practice.78 For example, in North Snake
Groundwater Distribution v. Idaho Department of Water Resources,79
the Director of the Department of Water Resources lacked the
authority to interpret a specific statutory term because the Idaho
legislature already defined that term in the statute.80 Thus, the court
gave no deference to the Director’s interpretation, referencing Simplot.81
But the North Snake court conflated the issue of the agency’s authority
with whether the statutory text answers the precise question at issue,
which the court addresses under Prong Three. Most Idaho courts look
to the agency’s authorizing statute to determine whether it has
authority to interpret the statute at issue, as in Pearl and A&B
Irrigation.82 But in some cases, the answer is so obvious that the court
fails to cite to the authorizing statute and generally concludes the
agency has the authority to administer the statute.83
Although Chevron deference is described as a two-step test, courts
really engage in three inquiries.84 The first is what some refer to as
“Chevron Step Zero,” which emerged from the Supreme Court’s holding
in United States v. Mead Corp.85 Chevron Step Zero requires the court
to determine whether Congress delegated to the agency the authority
to promulgate rules carrying the force of law, and whether the agency
did so.86 Only when the answer to both questions is “yes” may the court

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 1272–74.

78.

See, e.g., Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168
(Idaho 2002) (correctly applying Prong One to determine that the agency
has authority to administer the statute).

79.

376 P.3d 722 (Idaho 2016).

80.

Id. at 729.

81.

Id. at 728–29.

82.

Pearl, 44 P.3d at 1162; A&B Irrigation Distrib., 301 P.3d at 1272; see
also Duncan v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 232 P.3d 322, 325 (Idaho 2010);
Hood v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 868 P.2d 479, 481–82 (Idaho
1994).

83.

See, e.g., Sons & Daughters of Idaho, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm’n, 156
P.3d 524, 527 (2007); Canty v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 59 P.3d 983,
988 (Idaho 2002); Herrmann v. Idaho, 403 P.3d 318, 321 (Idaho Ct. App.
2017).

84.

Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 190–91 (2006).

85.

533 U.S. 218 (2001).

86.

Id. at 226–27.
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continue to Chevron Step One.87 If the answer is “no,” then the court’s
deference analysis proceeds under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.88 or Auer v.
Robbins. 89 Agencies act with the force of law through adjudication,
notice-and-comment rule making, or another comparable indication of
Congress’s intent. 90 While Chevron Step Zero appears similar to
Simplot’s Prong One, it differs in at least one important respect.
Simplot’s Prong One asks only whether the agency has authority to do
whatever it did, not whether the agency acted with the force of law. In
fact, Idaho has no secondary deference test for interpretations lacking
the force of law. Rather, Idaho courts focus on whether the agency
action interprets a statute, regulation, or informal rule.91
Prong One also differs from Chevron Step One. Chevron Step One
asks whether the legislature expressly or implicitly granted the agency
authority to construe the law, asking specifically whether “Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”92 The Chevron court
emphasized that Congress can implicitly delegate to the agency
interpretive authority via ambiguous statutory language.93 In Simplot,
the agency derives its authority to administer the statute only from the
agency’s authorizing statute, not ambiguity in the text. 94 In fact,
notwithstanding Prong Three, the Simplot court did not recognize
implicit delegation through ambiguity as a justification for deferring to
agencies.95 Instead, the Simplot court appreciated the permanence of
the administrative state and the utility of agencies in the administration
of the law.96 It premised agency deference on the idea that the court

87.

Id.

88.

See infra Part III.A. (explaining that Skidmore deference applies when
agency interpretation fails Chevron Step Zero by the agency acting
without the force of law).

89.

See infra Part III.B. (explaining that in Auer the Court held that an
agency’s interpretation of its own rules should be given deference unless
it is clearly inconsistent with the rules).

90.

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227.

91.

While Idaho courts do not employ this terminology, they distinguish
between agency interpretations that are promulgated through the
procedural requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act and
those that are not. See State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d 219, 225 (Idaho Ct. App.
2013).

92.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984).

93.

Id. at 844–45.

94.

J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho
1991).

95.

Id.

96.

See id. at 1211.
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can no longer interpret and apply the law without some aid from
agencies.97
Indeed, Idaho courts recognize that the Idaho legislature delegates
authority to an agency through the agency’s administering statute.98
When “charged with the duty of administering an act,” the agency “is
impliedly clothed with the power to construe it.”99 Thus, “[t]he court
must first determine if the agency has been entrusted with the
responsibility to administer the statute at issue.”100 Only if the agency
has received this authority will it be “‘impliedly clothed with the power
to construe’ the law.”101 This language originates in Kopp v. State.102 In
Kopp, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the Department of Law
Enforcement had broad powers to carry out provisions of Idaho’s Retail
Sale of Liquor by the Drink Act based on the fact that the Department
is responsible for administering and enforcing the Act. 103 The court
further held that the Department’s interpretation of the Act was
entitled to “great weight.”104 But the Kopp court made no finding that
the legislature had implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the
Department because the Act’s text was ambiguous. In fact, while noting
that it had never interpreted the provision of the Act at issue, the court
restated the parties’ competing interpretations but never expressly
declared the statute to be ambiguous. 105 After consulting the Act’s
legislative history, the court concluded that the Department’s inter–
pretation was correct.106 The Kopp court cited numerous cases for the
“impliedly clothed” language, none of which suggest that the legislature
implicitly delegates interpretive authority to agencies through
ambiguity in statutes.107 Because the power to construe the law is a
“necessary precedent to administrative action,”108 delegation to agencies

97.

Id.

98.

See infra text accompanying notes 99–108.

99.

Kopp v. State, 595 P.2d 309, 312 (Idaho 1979).

100. Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219.
101. Id. (quoting Kopp, 595 P.2d at 312).
102. Kopp, 595 P.2d at 312.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 311–12.
106. Id. at 313.
107. See id. at 312 (citing Okla. Real Estate Comm’n v. Nat’l Bus. & Prop.
Exch., Inc., 238 F.2d 606, 610 (10th Cir. 1956); Clark County Sch. Dist.
v. Local Gov. Emp. Mgmt. Relations Bd., 530 P.2d 114, 117 (Nev. 1974);
Wash. Twp. of Nemaha Cty. v. Hart, 215 P.2d 180 (Kan. 1950); Bodison
Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 109 P.2d 935, 939 (Cal. 1941)).
108. Id.
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is implicit only in the sense that an agency’s authority to administer
the law implies that it has the authority to interpret the law.
B.

Prong Two: Is the agency’s construction a reasonable interpretation
of the statute?

For Prong Two, the Simplot court noted that Idaho courts
consistently found deference inappropriate when an agency inter–
pretation “is so obscure and doubtful that it is entitled to no weight or
consideration.” 109 In its analysis of the Tax Commission’s inter–
pretation, the Simplot court generally concluded that the Commission’s
construction was reasonable “in the face of a statute that does not
directly address the question at issue.” 110 While the Commission
overlooked the statutory definition of “taxable income,” it was not
unreasonable for the Commission to conclude that a more specific
provision controlled over the more general definition.111
In determining whether an agency’s construction is reasonable,
Idaho courts look to whether the agency’s construction is consistent
with the statutory text, the legislature’s intent, and practices common
to the relevant industry.112 For example, in Pearl, a physician argued
that the Idaho Medical Practices Act required the Board of Professional
Discipline of the State Board of Medicine to hold its disciplinary
hearings with a panel of licensed physicians instead of a non-physician
hearing officer.113 The Act granted the Board the authority to hold a
disciplinary hearing with a panel of licensed physicians.114 But the Act
also allowed non-physician hearing officers to conduct evidentiary
hearings. 115 In no way did the Act restrict the hearing officers’
authority. Thus, the court found that it was reasonable for the Board
to conclude that the hearing officer could issue a recommendation based
on its evidentiary-hearing findings.116 Likewise, in Hamilton v. Reeder
Flying Services, Inc., 117 the court found reasonable the Industrial
109. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho
1991) (quoting State v. Omaechevviaria, 152 P. 280, 281 (Idaho 1915)).
110. Id. at 1220.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1214, 1219.
113. Pearl v. Bd. of Prof. Discipline, 44 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Idaho 2002).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1168; see also Floating Patio, LLC v. Idaho State Police, No. CV
2016 4100, 2017 Ida. Dist. LEXIS 24, at *16–17 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Apr. 20,
2017) (finding the agency’s interpretation to be reasonable when the
statute provided that undefined words should be given their ordinary and
commonly understood meanings, and the agency applied the dictionary
definition of a term not defined in the statute).
117. 21 P.3d 890 (Idaho 2001).
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Commission’s interpretation that the term “employed” meant the
moment when fertilizer pilots took their first flight of the season, not
when the employer “employed” them in the ordinary sense of the
word.118 The court found the interpretation reasonable in light of the
Commission’s long-standing custom, the legislature’s intent, and the
practical effect a contrary interpretation would have on the industry.119
Prong Two, like Chevron’s Step Two, allows the court to engage in
a full consideration of a statute’s meaning, 120 looking to the outer
bounds of the text. Under Chevron Step Two, the court looks to
whether the agency’s construction is a permissible reading of the
statute. 121 If the answer is “yes,” the court defers to the agency’s
interpretation. 122 But a reasonable interpretation is not enough under
Simplot’s Prong Two: the interpretation must still satisfy all three other
prongs, and the five rationales under Prong Four must weigh in favor
of deference.123 Thus, an interpretation that receives Chevron deference
because it is a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute may
not always receive deference under Simplot.
C.

Prong Three: Does the text answer the precise question at issue?

For Prong Three, the Simplot court explained that an agency’s
construction cannot contradict the clear expressions of the legislature.124
Although Prong Three employs nearly the same language as Chevron
Step One—“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue”125—Simplot differs in practice. When Idaho courts
apply each prong in numerical order, reaching Prong Three third, the
court must engage in the reasonableness inquiry under Prong Two
before determining whether the text answers the precise question at
issue.126 As discussed further in Part IV, this difference speaks to the
linguistic limitations of Chevron Step One. A court can ask whether the
language treats the precise question at issue, but the answer may
118. Id. at 895.
119. Id. at 893–94.
120. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 1004.
121. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
122. Id. at 843–44.
123. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 998–99.
124. J.R. Simplot, Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho
1991) (“[T]he court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”) (quoting Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842–43).
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; see also Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219 (framing
Prong Three as asking whether the question has “a precise statutory
answer”).
126. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 998.
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depend more on a judge’s interpretive approach than the language of
the statute itself. 127 When a court frames Chevron Step One as an
inquiry into whether the statute has a plain meaning and limits that
inquiry to the words of the statute (e.g., under a strict constructionist
or textualist approach), the court is more likely to find the statute does
have a plain meaning than if the court employed a purposivist
approach.128 Chevron’s plain-meaning inquiry usually devolves into a
“clearly preferred”-meaning inquiry depending on how the court frames
Step One, making deference to the agency less likely.129 Under Simplot,
the court must first approach the statute with a wide lens, asking
whether the agency’s construction is reasonable. Then, within the
context of that reasonableness inquiry, the court looks to whether the
statutory text already answers the question at issue.130 This framework
guides the court’s analysis away from a textualist approach towards a
more purposivist approach.
Yet Prong Three is still susceptible to the same linguistic mani–
pulation as Chevron Step One. When Idaho courts stray from the exact
language of Prong Three, they typically do so by asking whether the
statute is ambiguous, 131 potentially making Prong Three’s outcome
dependent on the court’s preferred method of statutory interpretation.
Although Prong Two guards against this manipulation by requiring the
court to analyze the reasonableness of the interpretation first, some
Idaho courts address the prongs out of order, beginning and ending the
inquiry with Prong Three.132 When the court addresses the prongs out
of order and frames Prong Three in terms of whether the statute is
ambiguous, the four-prong test could result in less deference to agencies,
just as with Chevron.
In Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 133 the Idaho Supreme
Court did just that. Without analyzing Prongs One or Four, the court
held that the agency’s interpretation deserved no deference because the
interpretation failed Prongs Two and Three.134 Under Prong Three, the
court asked whether the statute was ambiguous.135 But this was likely
because of the case’s procedural posture. The plaintiff appealed the
127. See infra text accompanying notes 212–19.
128. Id.
129. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale
L.J. 969, 991 (1992).
130. Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219.
131. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 208 P.3d 289, 296 (Idaho 2009);
Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 21 P.3d 890, 895 (Idaho 2001).
132. Farber, 208 P.3d at 293–94.
133. Id. at 289.
134. Id. at 296.
135. Id.
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district court’s finding that the statute was ambiguous.136 Neither party
brought an argument under Simplot at the district-court level, and the
State Insurance Fund raised it before the supreme court only as an
alternative argument.137 The supreme court first addressed the district
court’s finding that the statute was ambiguous, disagreeing with the
district court. 138 Then, upon addressing the Fund’s alternative
argument under Simplot, the supreme court concluded that the Fund’s
interpretation failed Prong Three because the statute was not
ambiguous and it precisely treated the question at issue.139
But Idaho courts typically address the prongs in numerical order.140
In Simplot, the court briefly addressed Prong Three third, finding that
the legislature had not “directly address[ed] the question . . . of
whether foreign source income can be included in the preapportionment
tax base . . . for the purpose of computing Idaho taxable income.”141
Idaho courts’ Prong Three analyses are usually brief,142 likely because
this prong is not issue determinative, and because the court has already
analyzed whether the interpretation is reasonable under Prong Two.143
If the agency’s interpretation survives Prong Two as a reasonable
interpretation, then it is unlikely that the language of the statute treats
the precise question at issue, unless the agency’s answer comports with
what the statute requires. And sometimes, as in Farber, Idaho courts
look to whether the statutory language is unambiguous before
determining whether the agency’s construction is entitled to deference
under Simplot.144 In these cases, the agency’s construction receives little

136. Id. at 292.
137. Id. at 295.
138. Id. at 293–94.
139. Id. at 296. But see Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers,
337 P.3d 655, 662 (Idaho 2014) (finding the Board’s interpretation
reasonable and thus entitled to deference under Simplot’s four-prong test).
140. See, e.g., Herrmann v. Idaho, 403 P.3d 318, 321–22 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017);
Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 21 P.3d 890, 893 (Idaho 2001); Garner
v. Horkley Oil, 853 P.2d 576, 578–79 (Idaho 1993); Preston v. Idaho State
Tax Comm’n, 960 P.2d 185, 187–89 (Idaho 1998); A & B Irrigation Dist.
v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 301 P.3d 1270, 1272 (Idaho 2012); Kuna
Boxing Club Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm’n, 233 P.3d 25 (2009); Canty v.
Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 59 P.3d 983, 988–90 (Idaho 2002).
141. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1220 (Idaho
1991).
142. See, e.g., Canty, 59 P.3d at 987; Hamilton, 21 P.3d at 895; Garner, 853
P.2d at 577.
143. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 1006.
144. Farber, 208 P.3d at 293–95.
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analysis under Prong Three because the court has already determined
whether the statutory language is clear.145
D.

Prong Four: Do the rationales traditionally justifying deference
weigh in favor of deference?

Prong Four permits the court to ask whether it makes sense to defer
to the agency. The Simplot court incorporated the five rationales
underlying Idaho’s deference regime into this prong: reliance,
practicality, legislative acquiescence or endorsement, contemporaneity,
and specialized expertise.146 Simplot does not require all rationales to be
present; rather, the test requires the court to balance the absence or
presence of each rationale, which the court does not have to weigh
equally. The absence of one or more of the rationales may constitute a
“cogent reason” for refusing to defer to an agency’s interpretation.147
The Simplot court specified that the absence of even one rationale, if
weighed heavily enough, could be a sufficient reason for denying
deference to the agency interpretation.148 And the court could weigh the
presence of only one rationale strongly enough for it to award the
agency’s interpretation “considerable weight” deference. 149 If, after
analyzing the five rationales, a court finds that there are no compelling
reasons to depart from the agency’s interpretation, then the court must
give “considerable weight” to the agency’s construction.150 If balancing
the rationales reveals compelling reasons for denying deference to the
agency, then the court may still defer to the agency’s construction to
the extent of its “persuasive force.”151
The Simplot court noted that under its pre-Fair Share deference
doctrine, courts could generally claim that “cogent reasons” existed for
denying deference without specifying what those reasons were.152 Now,
the court retains some flexibility, but it must explain its analysis in
terms of Prong Four’s five rationales. A court cannot claim that “cogent
reasons” exist for rejecting the agency interpretation without explaining
those reasons.153
145. See Canty, 59 P.3d at 987–89 (looking first to the language of the statute,
then applying in order the four prongs, and finding that the statute does
not answer the precise question at issue).
146. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
147. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho
1991).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1219–20.
152. Id. at 1211–12.
153. Id. at 1219.
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In Simplot, the court held that the Tax Commission’s interpretation
was not entitled to considerable deference after balancing the five
rationales because all five rationales were absent. 154 There was no
reliance interest in Simplot’s interpretation of the tax law given the
recent legislation. And the court found that the Tax Commission’s
interpretation was no more practical than Simplot’s; 155 if anything,
Simplot’s interpretation was more practical than the Commission’s.
The legislature could not have acquiesced to the Commission’s
interpretation because the 1985 Idaho Income Tax Act included express
language that denied any legislative intent as to the construction of
prior versions of the Act,156 and legislative inaction is not a reliable
source of legislative intent.157 The Tax Commission did not issue its
interpretation contemporaneously with the tax law because the Idaho
tax law was most recently revised in 1979, and the disputed
interpretation arose out of deficiency notices issued in 1984.158 As for
the last rationale—agency expertise—even though the Tax Commission
was an expert in Idaho taxation, the Commission did not employ its
expertise in construing the statute. It prepared no regulations or written
instructions. It communicated its interpretation only by issuing notices
of deficiency determinations years after the taxes had been filed.159 On
this point, the court also noted that the Tax Commission did not
“exhaust[] its thinking” on the interpretation prior to the instant
litigation. 160 Because not one of the five rationales justified the
Commission’s interpretation, the court held that there were “cogent
reasons” to deny “considerable weight” to the agency’s interpretation.161
Finally, with the agency’s construction left to its “persuasive force,” the
court rejected that construction, calling it a “strained” reading of an
otherwise straightforward statute.162
While Prong Four lacks similarity to Chevron in all respects, it
resembles the factors courts employed pre-Chevron. Thomas Merrill
categorizes the pre-Chevron factors into three groups: (1) those
addressing Congressional intent; (2) factors addressing attributes of the
agency’s decision; and (3) those demonstrating congruence between the

154. Id. at 1220.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1221.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1222.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1223.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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agency’s interpretation and Congress’s intent. 163 When analyzing
factors in the first grouping, courts looked to whether Congress had
specifically delegated authority to an agency.164 For factors in group
two, the court considered whether an agency exercised its expertise,
whether its interpretation represented a consistent interpretation, and
whether the interpretation was the fruit of reasoned analysis.165 Courts
analyzed group three’s factors by considering whether the agency’s
construction was contemporaneous with the passage of the statute or
whether Congress had ratified the agency’s construction. 166 The
Chevron Court also looked to similar rationales for deferring to
agencies: filling gaps left by Congress, reconciling conflicting policies,
and giving due weight to an agency’s expertise.167 More recently, in
Kisor v. Wilkie,168 the Supreme Court articulated similar factors for
consideration when deciding whether to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation (i.e., Auer deference). 169 This
suggests that the rationales for deference identified in Simplot are
consistent with those imbedded in the U.S. Supreme Court’s history of
judicial deference. As Merrill notes, the Court has employed some of
the above factors for over 150 years, and they may “reflect[] deep-seated
judicial intuitions about the kinds of considerations that ought to bear
on the decision to defer.”170

III. Fitting into the Deference Puzzle
This section examines how Simplot would fit into the federal
administrative landscape, specifically addressing Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., Auer v. Robbins, and National Cable and Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X. If the Supreme Court abandons Chevron
deference, it will raise a plethora of questions about how the court
should continue to apply Skidmore and Auer deference, if at all, and
whether Brand X’s holding still applies.

163. Merrill, supra note 129, at 973.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 973–74.
166. Id. at 974.
167. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
45 (1984).
168. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
169. See id. at 2416–17 (directing courts to consider “markers” for identifying
when Auer deference is appropriate, including whether the interpretation
is authoritative, whether the interpretation implicates the agency’s
substantive expertise, and whether the interpretation reflects the agency’s
“fair and considered judgment”).
170. Merrill, supra note 129, at 975.
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Skidmore v. Swift & Co.

Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 171 courts may defer to agency
interpretations, with the weight of deference depending on “the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”172
While Chevron first left courts confused about the status and
applicability of Skidmore deference,173 United States v. Mead Corp.174
clarified that Skidmore applies when an agency interpretation fails
Chevron Step Zero; or in other words, when an agency acts without the
force of law. 175 Even though Idaho’s four-prong test does not ask
whether the agency acted with the force of law, its framework still
allows for federal courts to apply Skidmore deference at two junctures.
First, federal courts could apply Skidmore deference to agency
interpretations of regulations or informal rules.176 Simplot applies only
to an agency’s statutory interpretations, and Idaho courts employ the
free-review standard when interpreting an agency’s interpretations of
regulations or rules. 177 Rather than asking at Chevron Step Zero
whether an agency acted with the force of law, courts would identify
the agency’s interpretation as a construction of a statute, a regulation,
or an informal rule. When the agency is construing a regulation or
informal rule, the court would apply Skidmore deference.
Second, courts could apply Skidmore after Prong Four. Because an
agency’s construction deserves no deference when it fails at Prong One,
Two, or Three, these prongs are the threshold issues for whether the
interpretation deserves any deference at all. Once an interpretation
survives the first three prongs, the remaining question is not whether to
defer to the agency, but how much deference is appropriate. At this
point, the agency’s interpretation will receive at least some deference
according to its “persuasive value” after the court analyzes Prong
Four’s five deference rationales. If the interpretation fails Prong Four,
courts could then apply Skidmore. The only difference is that the
decision about whether to apply Skidmore occurs at Simplot Prong Four
rather than Chevron Step Zero.

171. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
172. Id. at 140.
173. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1237 (2007).
174. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
175. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 173, at 1237.
176. This would supplant Auer deference. See supra notes 143–159 and
accompanying text.
177. Mason v. Donnelly, 21 P.3d 903, 905 (Idaho 2001).
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On the other hand, federal courts can determine quite quickly
whether to apply Chevron or Skidmore. 178 One could argue that
applying Skidmore after applying Simplot’s first three prongs and
analyzing five different deference rationales under its fourth prong is
far more analysis than necessary, if not completely superfluous. By the
time a court has analyzed Prong Four’s rationales and finds no
compelling reasons for affording an agency great-weight deference, it
has already fully assessed the persuasive value of the agency’s
interpretation. There are few cases in which an agency’s interpretation
fails Prong Four after having survived the first three; but when it does,
it may receive no deference at all.179
But federal courts continue to apply a multi-factor analysis when
determining whether to apply Skidmore or Chevron, as the Supreme
Court did in Barnhart v. Walton.180 Under Barnhart, courts may look
to more than the formality of the procedures through which an agency
issued an interpretation. Specifically, courts should consider the
agency’s interpretive method and the nature of the question at issue.181
The Barnhart Court considered “the interstitial nature of the legal
question, the related expertise of the [a]gency, the importance of the
question to the administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the [a]gency has given the
question over a long period.”182 The rationales of Prong Four do not
represent every justification for deferring to an agency interpretation;
the Idaho Supreme Court identified only those justifications supported
by its own case history.183 Incorporating Skidmore would allow federal
courts to consider additional rationales to defer to an agency’s
interpretation the court finds somewhat persuasive, even if that
interpretation is not entitled to great weight.184
178. See, e.g., Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(finding that Chevron “clearly applies” to the Attorney General’s
interpretation of the INA); Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of
Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 48 (D.C. Dist. 2018) (finding that the
Department of Education’s interpretation of the Higher Education Act
“qualified as ‘an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,’
positioned squarely within the Chevron framework”).
179. See, e.g., Johnston v. Bureau of Crim. Identification, No. CV-2012-1442,
2012 Ida. Dist. LEXIS 20 at *10–12 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2012).
180. 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (applying Chevron to an agency interpretation
promulgated through less formal means than notice-and-comment).
181. Id. at 222.
182. Id.
183. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1214–15
(Idaho 1991).
184. See Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 363 F. Supp. 3d 67, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding
that agency guidelines deserved “considerable deference” even if not
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Still, if applying Skidmore after Prong Four is superfluous, courts
could reduce their Skidmore analysis to a one-sentence conclusion
stating that, through its four-prong analysis, it finds that the agency’s
interpretation lacks persuasive force. Idaho courts already take a similar
approach when an interpretation fails Prong Four.185 And so eventually,
courts might cease to apply Skidmore at all.
Despite these issues, the transition from Chevron to Idaho’s fourprong test would raise fewer questions about Skidmore’s validity than
would transitioning from Chevron to de novo review. If the Supreme
Court abandons Chevron deference for de novo review but changes
nothing with respect to Skidmore deference, lower federal courts would
be left with a deference scheme in which an agency’s interpretations
promulgated with the force of law receive less deference than its
guidelines and opinion letters that the courts find persuasive. The only
way the Court could abandon Chevron without having to immediately
address Skidmore’s validity would be to either apply Skidmore to all
agency interpretations rather than resorting to de novo review or
abandon Skidmore as well. With its capacity to incorporate Skidmore,
Idaho’s four-prong test resolves these inconsistencies and allows
Skidmore to simply fade into the background, should courts find the
additional analysis unnecessary.
B. Auer v. Robbins

In Auer v. Robbins,186 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior ruling
in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,187 where the Court held that
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation demands deference
unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” 188 The Auer Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s
interpretation of its own regulations regarding whether employees were
entitled to overtime pay. Because the Secretary was interpreting its
own regulation, the Court looked to whether the interpretation was
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”;189 if it was not,

entitled to Chevron deference because “they were passed with extensive
process and formality, are detailed and reflect [the agency’s] considerable
expertise . . . , and are routinely cited by courts as persuasive authority
on the meaning of the [statute]”); Lewis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,
314 F. Supp. 3d 135, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (applying Barnhart’s factors
to determine whether Chevron applies to the agency’s action).
185. See Johnston v. Bureau of Crim. Identification, No. CV-2012-1442, 2012
Ida. Dist. LEXIS 20 at *10–12 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2012).
186. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
187. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
188. Id. at 414.
189. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989).
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the Secretary’s interpretation controlled.190 The Court found that the
agency’s construction “easily met” this standard because the language
of the regulation “comfortably [bore] the meaning the Secretary
assign[ed].”191
Like Chevron, Auer has received its share of criticism.192 In fact,
these criticisms were recently at the forefront in Kisor v. Wilkie,193 in
which the Supreme Court declined to overturn the doctrine.194 While
Auer may be described as the application of Chevron to an agency’s
interpretations of its own regulations,195 it is an independent doctrine
that reaffirms Seminole Rock, which pre-dates Chevron by nearly forty
years.196 Thus, it is at least conceivable that Auer could stand on its
own in the absence of Chevron if the Court finds that the two doctrines
are supported by different justifications.197
Whether Auer could exist in harmony with Simplot’s four-prong
test depends on whether federal courts would analyze an agency’s
interpretations of administrative regulations or rules under Simplot or
under a de novo standard. Idaho courts applied their version of de novo

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–19 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (urging the Court
to reconsider Auer deference because “the power to write a law and the
power to interpret it cannot rest in the same hands”); John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations
of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 617 (1996) (arguing that
Seminole Rock deference should be replaced by “a standard that imposes
an independent judicial check on the agency’s determination of regulatory
meaning”).
193. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
194. Id. at 2407.
195. Decker, 568 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
196. See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
197. See Manning, supra note 192, at 617–18 (suggesting that Chevron is
premised on the principle that Congress delegates policy discretion to
agencies through ambiguity, and Seminole Rock is premised on the idea
of an agency’s “superior political accountability, policymaking
competence, and historical familiarity with the regulatory text”); see also
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (“Issues
surrounding judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own
regulations are distinct from those raised in connection with judicial
deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress.”); id.
at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Chief
Justice Roberts that the Court’s ruling on Auer deference should not be
read to implicate Chevron deference).
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review—the free-review standard—to agency regulations and rules.198
Thus, federal courts could apply Simplot to agency interpretations of
statutes while continuing to apply Auer to agency interpretations of
administrative regulations.
But this would contravene the main justifications for adopting
Idaho’s four-prong test in the first place. Auer demands deference to
agency interpretations of regulations that are not “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation,” a standard the Simplot court
rejected.199 And the traditional justifications for Auer deference do not
mirror those analyzed under Simplot’s Prong Four. Whereas the
Simplot court identified reliance, practicality, legislative acquiescence,
legislative contemporaneity, and agency expertise as the traditional
justifications for deferring to agencies, Auer deference (or Seminole
Rock deference) is mainly premised on political accountability and an
agency’s superior competence in interpreting its own text.200
Courts could resolve this inconsistency by analyzing different
factors under Prong Four depending on whether the agency is inter–
preting a statute or a regulation. The Supreme Court directs courts to
do as much in Kisor v. Wilkie. When analyzing whether to defer to an
agency’s interpretation of a regulation under Auer and Seminole Rock,
a court must first determine whether the regulation is “genuinely
ambiguous.”201 Then the court determines whether the agency’s inter–
pretation is a reasonable construction of the regulation.202 Lastly, the
court must inquire into whether “the character and context of the
agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”203 Declining to
prescribe an “exhaustive test” for this inquiry, the Kisor Court instead
identified three analytic “markers”: (1) whether the agency’s
interpretation is authoritative; (2) whether the interpretation
implicates the agency’s expertise; and (3) whether the agency’s
interpretation reflects its fair and considered judgment.204

198. See, e.g., Mason v. Donnelly Club, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (Idaho 2001)
(applying “free review” to determine whether two-weeks constitutes a
“short time” under the Department of Labor’s regulation).
199. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Idaho
1991) (“While courts of some states continue to invoke the traditional
rule giving great weight to the interpretations of agencies, they are
equivocal in their application, leaving the impression that their
administrative agency interpretations are entitled to judicial deference
only when those interpretations are correct.”).
200. See Manning, supra note 192, at 629–30; Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412–14.
201. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414.
202. Id. at 2415–16.
203. Id. at 2416.
204. Id. at 2416–18.
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But applying different factors depending on whether the court is
analyzing a statute or regulation could lead to inconsistencies in the
frequency with which courts defer to regulations as opposed to statutes.
Courts could end up deferring to agency interpretations of one or the
other more often without any real justification for doing so. Although
both Simplot and Auer incorporate a factor analysis, their underlying
policy justifications are fundamentally different. Based on these
differences, Auer and Simplot are irreconcilable, and the Supreme Court
would have to overrule both Auer and Chevron if it chose to adopt
Simplot’s four-prong test.
C. National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services

In National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Brand
X Internet Services, the Supreme Court held that “[a] court’s prior
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that
its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute, and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”205 The Court reasoned that
when Congress implicitly delegates interpretive authority to an agency
via statutory ambiguity, judicial precedent cannot override an agency’s
interpretation.206
Because Brand X applies to agency interpretations that are entitled
to Chevron deference, federal courts could reformulate the rule so that
it applies to agency interpretations entitled to deference under Simplot.
Courts would continue to defer to an agency’s interpretation when it
survives all four prongs. If the agency’s interpretation survives Prongs
One through Three, Prong Four’s deference rationales allow the court
to compare the agency’s interpretation to the court’s prior construction,
providing the court with reasons to affirm the prior construction. If the
judicial precedent is long-standing, then the court could argue that the
reliance rationale is a compelling reason to refuse great-weight deference
to the agency’s interpretation. The court could also argue that the
legislative-acquiescence rationale supports the court’s interpretation; if
Congress disagreed with the court’s interpretation, it would have
clarified the ambiguity. Or, if the agency has employed specialized
expertise in developing its interpretation, the court may decide that it
makes sense to adopt the agency’s interpretation. Again, if the agency’s
interpretation is more practical than the court’s, the court may choose
to adopt the agency’s interpretation. In this sense, the court can
exercise independent judicial review. Because the court would choose
to adopt the agency’s interpretation, not necessarily defer to it, the
agency would not override judicial precedent.
205. 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
206. Id.
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It is possible, however, that overturning Chevron would necessitate
the end of Brand X as well. Because Brand X is premised on the main
principle of Chevron—the presumption that Congress delegates
authority to agencies via statutory ambiguity 207 —rejecting Chevron
could unmoor Brand X from this foundational principle. A court would
once again have to decide whether its prior construction trumps the
agency’s interpretation, which a court could hold under Simplot, as
discussed above, or under de novo review.208

IV. Improving the Test
Although Idaho’s four-prong test has some advantages over
Chevron, it does not completely cure the statutory-interpretation
problems that arise out of Chevron Step One. While Idaho courts most
commonly apply the four prongs in numerical order, 209 there are
instances in which a court has addressed the prongs out of order or
resolved the case on Prong Three alone.210 Asking whether the statute’s
text answers the precise question at issue demands more precision than
our language is capable of, and how the court approaches this question
can significantly alter the outcome of the case. 211 Assessing the
reasonableness of an agency’s interpretation prior to determining
whether the statute answers the precise question at issue limits the
extent to which the court’s interpretive approach controls the outcome.
Thus, if the Supreme Court is to adopt Idaho’s four-prong test, it should
clarify that courts are to apply the four prongs in numerical order, and
that they should refrain from resolving the issue on Prong Three
without first analyzing Prong Two.
As previously discussed, Chevron’s Step One and Simplot’s Prong
Three ask the court to determine whether the statute’s text answers
the precise question at issue.212 Under Chevron, agency constructions
receive deference only when the court finds that the statute’s text does

207. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1172.
208. Whether applying the de novo standard to these constructions undermines
the role of agencies is beyond the scope of this Note.
209. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
210. See N. Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 376 P.3d
722, 729 (Idaho 2016); Farrell v. Whiteman, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 n.2
(Idaho 2009).
211. Compare Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 208 P.3d 289, 296 (Idaho 2009)
(finding the language of Idaho Code § 72-915 to be unambiguous), with
Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 21 P.3d 890, 894–895 (Idaho 2001)
(finding ambiguity in the word “employment” in Idaho Code § 72212(9)).
212. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
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not resolve the issue.213 But when a judge or Justice is more likely to
find that the meaning of the statute “is apparent from its text,” she is
less likely to defer to the agency’s construction.214 As Justice Scalia
explained: “It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to
accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not
personally adopt.” 215 Justice Scalia attributed this result to his
textualist approach to statutory interpretation.216 Critics of Chevron
take issue with this outcome, arguing that Chevron ceases to be a rule
at all if judges can circumvent its mandate by applying a strict
constructionist approach. 217 Justice Kavanaugh has also argued that
whether a statute is ambiguous is an unanswerable question because
judges will always disagree, and ambiguity inquiries open the door for
judges to insert their own policy preferences.218 Furthermore, those who
advocate for a purposivist interpretative approach object on the
grounds that Chevron’s framework allows textualist judges to ignore a
statute’s legislative history. 219 Under Simplot, when addressing the
prongs in numerical order, the court asks under Prong Two whether
the agency’s construction is reasonable before moving on to Prong
Three.220 Thus, the court begins its analysis under Prong Three with a
wider lens after having considered factors beyond the text of the
statute.221
The Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Hamilton v. Reeder Flying
Service222 exemplifies how the order of Prong Two and Prong Three
controls the outcome of the case. At issue on appeal was whether the
deceased claimant, a pilot employed by Reeder, qualified for workers’
213. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).
214. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 521 (1989).
215. Id.; see also Kent Barnett et al., Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics,
71 Vand. L. Rev. 1465 (2018) (noting that although “conservative panels
are more likely to agree with conservative statutory interpretations and
less likely to agree with liberal ones, and liberal panels are less likely to
agree with conservative statutory interpretations and more likely to agree
with liberal ones,” id. at 1495, “Chevron deference markedly curbs
ideological behavior among reviewing circuit judges,” id. at 1502).
216. Scalia, supra note 214, at 521.
217. See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2140.
218. Id. at 2135–39.
219. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1392, 1423 (2017).
220. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho
1991).
221. Cf. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 219, at 1423–24.
222. 21 P.3d 890 (Idaho 2001).
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compen–sation benefits. The relevant provision of the Idaho Code
stated that employers are exempt from providing benefits if “the
employer files with, and has written approval by, the industrial
commission prior to employing a pilot.”223 To receive approval from the
Industrial Commission, pilots had to apply each season for accident
insurance, and they had to send evidence of that insurance to the
Commission for approval. 224 While the deceased claimant received
accident coverage before taking his first flight of the season, he did not
receive approval from the Commission until thirteen days after his first
flight.225 Reeder argued that it complied with the intent of the Idaho
Code, and that the Commission had a twenty-seven-year-old custom
according to which the exemption takes effect when the pilot submits
his application for accident insurance along with his first premium
payment.226 Reeder further argued that the Commission condoned this
practice by consistently granting approval long after pilots began their
flying season.227 At the administrative hearing, the Commission found
that employers were exempt if the pilot had obtained accident insurance
before the first flight of the season even if he or she had not yet received
approval from the Commission. The claimant then appealed the
Commission’s decision.228
After finding under Prong One that the Industrial Commission had
authority to administer the relevant statute, the court addressed Prong
Two, whether the Commission’s interpretation was reasonable.229 The
court began by stating “the application of a statute is an aid to
construction when the public relies on the application over a long period
of time,” and then looked to the Commission’s justifications for its
interpretation. 230 First, because pilots would be covered by the
necessary insurance before their first flights of the season even if they
had not yet received Commission approval, the court found that the
Commission’s interpretation satisfied the statute’s intent.231 Second, the
Commission’s interpretation also minimized the expense incurred by
employers because pilots would not have to wait for approval—
sometimes until the middle of the flying season—to begin flying. 232
223. Id. at 892.
224. Id. at 891–92.
225. Id. at 892.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 893.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Lastly, the Commission made no objection to this practice for twentyseven years, giving employers the impression that the exemption was
met as long as pilots obtained their insurance policies before their first
flights.233
The court then addressed the statute’s legislative history, finding
that it supported the Commission’s interpretation. The statute’s state–
ment of purpose specified that it was intended to “exempt
pilots . . . from the Workmen’s Compensation coverage provided they
file with the Industrial Commission evidence of insurance coverage.”234
The statute provided no specific procedure according to which pilots
must meet the requirements. The Commission’s interpretation was also
consistent with a recent amendment to the statute. Based upon the
above findings, the court held that the Commission’s interpretation was
reasonable, satisfying Prong Two.235
Next, the court analyzed Prong Three, finding that the statute’s
language did not expressly treat the question at issue because it was
susceptible to more than one interpretation. The court held that the
statute’s language could be interpreted as meaning either that the
employer had to file proof of insurance before employing the pilot or
that the employer had to file proof of insurance and obtain approval
prior to employing the pilot.236 The Commission argued that the phrase
“prior to employing” could be interpreted as meaning prior to
employing a pilot to fly or prior to the pilot’s first flight of the season.237
The court agreed with the Commission’s findings with respect to the
term “employment.” Because the statute did not expressly address how
one should construe the term employment, the Commission’s
interpretation passed Prong Three.238
The court then moved on to Prong Four, determining whether any
of the traditional rationales justifying deference were present. The court
concluded that the Commission’s interpretation represented a wellestablished industry custom, and that interpreting workers’ compen–
sation statutes was the Commission’s area of expertise.239 These two
rationales were sufficient to satisfy Prong Four, and the court deferred
to the Commission’s interpretation.240
If the court had addressed Prong Three before Prong Two, however,
it may have been more likely to find that the statute already answered
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 893–94.
236. Id. at 894.
237. Id. at 894–95.
238. Id. at 895.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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the precise question at issue. In finding that the term “employment”
was subject to more than one interpretation, the court considered that,
for twenty-seven years, the Commission had consistently interpreted
“employment” to mean the time during which a pilot is actually flying;
whereas an ordinary reader of the statute may understand it to mean
“the moment at which the employment contract is entered into.”241 If
the court looked only at the language of the statute before considering
whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, it could have
concluded that “prior to employing a pilot” clearly meant prior to
entering into an employment contract with the pilot, answering the
precise question at issue. As is the case with Chevron, a textualist court
could find that the statute’s language is clear, and thus deny the
agency’s construction any deference based solely on Prong Three. If
Idaho’s test is to replace Chevron and lead to more consistent results
by eliminating a threshold ambiguity inquiry, courts must apply
Simplot’s prongs in numerical order.

Conclusion
Four decades ago, the Supreme Court sought to simplify its analysis
of agency interpretations, holding that deference to an agency’s
statutory interpretation was no longer discretionary, but mandatory.242
Today, critics challenge Chevron on multiple fronts, arguing that it
violates Article III and that courts apply it so inconsistently that it
ceases to be a coherent doctrine.243 And although Chevron may be a
“mutation produced by the pressures of litigation,” 244 agencies have
become institutionalized as a significant component of our government.
As Thomas Merrill recognizes, “[i]nstitutions are created, and become
entrenched, in response to one set of imperatives . . . . By the time
complications or objections come to the fore, the inertia of institutional
change is too great to undo them.”245 Even if the Court rejects Chevron,
it will still have to deal with an entire framework of administrative law.
While some advocate for de novo review,246 agency deference does not
have to be an all-or-nothing matter.247 Idaho’s four-prong test is a viable
alternative, both eliminating Chevron’s threshold ambiguity inquiry
and permitting the court to engage in a more searching judicial review.
Where Chevron mandates deference, Idaho’s test permits courts to
241. Id.
242. Merrill, supra note 129, at 971.
243. See Hamburger, supra note 6, at 1189; Merrill, supra note 129, at 980.
244. Merrill, supra note 11, at 972.
245. Id. at 997.
246. See Hamburger, supra note 6, at 1249–50.
247. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1146; Merrill, supra note 129, at 969–71.
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reject an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute when the
traditional justifications for deference are absent. Idaho courts defer
when it makes sense to do so, such as when an agency employs
specialized expertise, which is also a long-standing rationale for
deference in the federal courts.248
Although the recent trend of state courts and legislatures
abandoning deference for de novo review may suggest that federal
courts should follow suit, some states exercise their independent
judgment in the context of a Skidmore-like factor analysis, still
considering various justifications for deferring to an agency’s
interpretation. For example, Alaska courts employ two standards of
review when analyzing an agency’s constructions of law.249 The first—a
rational basis test according to which the court defers as long as the
interpretation is reasonable—applies to agency interpretations that
implicate an agency’s specialized expertise or fundamental policy
decisions within the scope of the agency’s discretion.250 The second is
an “independent judgment standard” under which the court interprets
the statute de novo.251 Alaska courts employ this standard when the
issue does not implicate the agency’s expertise. 252 California follows
Skidmore, looking to “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s]
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”253 And New Hampshire courts
recognize that, while not controlling, an agency’s interpretation is
persuasive when the legislature has entrusted the agency with the
primary authority to interpret the statute.254
While some still question the immediacy of Chevron’s impending
demise,255 beyond Chevron lies a plethora of theoretical models, state
doctrines, and legislative directives waiting to fill its void. Careful
thought is due to which of these options most appropriately
accommodates not only the Constitution’s separation of powers but the
efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative state. While Idaho
may seem an unlikely source of legal innovation, its unique four-prong
248. Merrill, supra note 129, at 973.
249. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903
(Alaska 1987).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 22 P.3d 324, 335 (Cal.
2001) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031, 1038–39 (Cal. 1998)).
254. Dep’t of Revenue Admin. v. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd., 380 A.2d
1085, 1086 (N.H. 1977).
255. See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 219, at 1397–98.
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test is aptly suited for the federal administrative landscape, and is a
viable alternative to Chevron.
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